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JOINT NOTIFICATION
ADDRESSED TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE COURT:
The Hague, 1 September 2015
On behalf of the State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland, in
accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, we have the honor to transmit to you an original of the Special
Agreement for submission to the International Court of Justice of the
differences between the Applicant and the Respondent concerning the Frost
files, signed in The Hague, The Netherlands, on the first day of September in
the year two thousand fifteen.

Mata Rosenberg, Klaus Hall, Ambassador of the State of Amestonia
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Riesland to the Kingdom of The
Netherlands to the Kingdom of The Netherlands
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SPECIAL AGREEMENT

SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE BY
THE STATE OF AMESTONIA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF RIESLAND
ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM CONCERNING
THE FROST FILES
The State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland (hereinafter
referred to as “Amestonia” and “Riesland” respectively and “the Parties”
collectively),
Considering that differences have arisen between them concerning the
legality of certain alleged acts of espionage, and other matters;
Recognizing that the Parties have been unable to settle these differences by
means of negotiation; and
Desiring further to define the issues to be submitted to the International Court
of Justice (hereinafter referred to as “the Court”) to resolve this dispute;
In furtherance thereof the Parties have concluded this Special Agreement:
Article 1
The Parties submit the questions contained in this Special Agreement
(together with Clarifications to follow) (“the Case”) to the Court pursuant to
Article 40(1) of the Statute of the Court.
Article 2
(a)

(b)

(a)

It is agreed by the Parties that Amestonia shall act as Applicant and
Riesland as Respondent, but such agreement is without prejudice to
any question of the burden of proof.
The Parties agree that any reference in this Special Agreement to
documents obtained and disclosed without the consent of
Respondent is without prejudice to Respondent’s objection to the
admissibility of these documents as evidence before the Court.
Article 3
The rules and principles of international law applicable to the
dispute, on the basis of which the Court is requested to decide the
Case, are those referred to in Article 38, paragraph 1 of the Statute
of the Court.
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The Court is also requested to determine the legal consequences,
including the rights and obligations of the Parties, arising from its
Judgment on the questions presented in the Case.
Article 4

(a)

(b)

All questions of rules and procedure shall be regulated in accordance
with the provisions of the Official Rules of the 2016 Philip C. Jessup
International Law Moot Court Competition.
The Parties request the Court to order that the written proceedings
should consist of Memorials presented by each of the Parties not later
than the date set forth in the Official Schedule of the 2016 Philip C.
Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition.
Article 5

(a)

(b)

The Parties shall accept any Judgment of the Court as final and
binding upon them and shall execute it in its entirety and in good
faith.
Immediately after the transmission of any Judgment, the Parties shall
enter into negotiations on the modalities for its execution.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized, have
signed the present Special Agreement and have affixed thereto their
respective seals of office.
Done in The Hague, The Netherlands, this first day of September in
the year two thousand fifteen, in triplicate in the English language.
Mata Rosenberg, Klaus Hall, Ambassador of the State of Amestonia
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Riesland to the Kingdom of The
Netherlands to the Kingdom of The Netherlands
**SPECIAL AGREEMENT**
THE CASE CONCERNING THE FROST FILES
AMESTONIA / RIESLAND
1.

Riesland is a developed democratic state with a population of
approximately 100 million, which boasts one of the fastest growing
free-market economies in the world. Many of Riesland’s top
corporations are listed on the New York, London, and Shanghai
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stock exchanges. Its rapidly-expanding information technology and
communications sector is world-renowned.
Amestonia is a developing country bordering Riesland to the south,
with a population of approximately 20 million. Amestonia is a
predominantly agrarian export economy. Agriculture employs 55%
of Amestonia’s workforce.
The Rieslandic Secret Surveillance Bureau (“the Bureau”) engages,
inter alia, in covert operations and collects intelligence outside of
Riesland pursuant to the provisions of the Secret Surveillance
Bureau Act 1967 (“SSBA”), as amended.
Section 21 of the SSBA, entitled “Electronic Surveillance,” grants
the Director of the Bureau (“the Director”) the power to authorize
“electronic surveillance,” without a court order, to acquire “foreign
intelligence.” The SSBA defines “electronic surveillance” as “the
installation of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device
outside Riesland’s territory, and/or the acquisition by such a device
of the content of or other technical information concerning a wire or
radio communication.” The statute defines “foreign intelligence” as
“any information located or emanating from outside Riesland’s
territory, which is relevant to the ability of Riesland to protect itself
against any actual or potential threat to its national security or the
ability of Riesland to conduct its foreign affairs.”
Section 32 of the SSBA, “Minimization Procedures and Structural
Safeguards,” sets forth five limitations on the Bureau’s surveillance
activity. First, electronic surveillance may not be authorized by the
Director whenever there is a “substantial likelihood” that
information acquired thereby will include “any communication to
which a national of Riesland is a party.” Second, it establishes a fivejudge National Security Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), which must
review all electronic surveillance conducted under the SSBA every
six months. Proceedings before the Tribunal are closed to the public,
but the Tribunal is authorized to call on technical experts, academics,
and NGOs to participate as amici curiae. Third, a Parliamentary
Committee for Surveillance Oversight is created, with access to all
information relating to the Bureau’s operations, and the capacity to
launch independent investigations and to summon the Bureau’s
Director and other personnel to appear before it. Fourth, the statute
provides that surveillance of “foreign public officials” may be
authorized only when the Director, with the concurrence of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, considers it “necessary.” Fifth, the
Bureau must comply with any regulations issued by the Attorney
General concerning legal aspects of any surveillance program.
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Relations between Riesland and Amestonia, which share a common
language and have similar ethnic composition, have been largely
positive. On 11 December 1970, Riesland’s Prime Minister visited
Amestonia to mark the centenary of the completion of the first
railway line between the two countries. During that visit, the Prime
Minister and his Amestonian counterpart signed a number of
bilateral agreements, concerning tourism, trade, extradition,
intelligence-sharing, and other fields of cooperation. Since then, the
two nations have enjoyed healthy cross-border economic, cultural
and security ties, including the establishment of a free-trade area in
agricultural and agricultural-related goods in 1992. By 1998,
Riesland had become the top importer of Amestonian agricultural
produce, totaling approximately €1.5 million per day. Between 2003
and 2013, Amestonia saw an annual GDP growth rate of between
6.8% and 7.4%, the highest in the region.
On 4 March 1992, Riesland and Amestonia signed the “Treaty on
The Establishment of Broadcasting Facilities” (“the Broadcasting
Treaty,” Annex I), pursuant to which each state was permitted to
build, staff, and operate a television station in the other’s territory. In
a joint press release, ministers from both states expressed their hopes
that the treaty “will become yet another milestone in what is already
the warmest of friendships between our two societies.” Both Parties
ratified the Broadcasting Treaty shortly thereafter.
Riesland National Television is a state-owned and operated
corporation, which provides public broadcasting services across
Riesland. In accordance with the Broadcasting Treaty, Riesland
established a new division of the corporation, The Voice of Riesland
(“VoR”), to operate in Amestonia. The inaugural program of the new
station and its Amestonian counterpart, a combined performance by
the two countries’ national orchestras of Vivaldi’s “The Four
Seasons,” aired on 22 December 1992. VoR broadcast a variety of
award-winning documentaries and highly-acclaimed programs for
the next 22 years.
One of VoR’s most popular shows was “Tea Time with Margaret,”
a weekly one-hour news program featuring interviews with leading
Amestonian political and business figures. Margaret Mayer, the
show’s host, is a television icon from Riesland, appointed by the
Ministry of Telecommunications to serve as Head of VoR. Among
those appearing on her show were former and incumbent
Amestonian presidents, cabinet ministers, parliamentary party
leaders, business executives, and diplomats.
The Institute for Land and Sustainable Agriculture (“ILSA”), a
Dutch NGO established for the purpose of monitoring global soil
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structure, composition, and biodiversity, began to express concerns
in the early 1990s about the long-term sustainability of Amestonia’s
agricultural production and trade. In particular, ILSA’s reports
addressed Amestonian farmers’ reliance on a class of neuro-active
insecticides known as neonicotinoids, or “neonics,” produced solely
by Rieslandic companies, to boost yields. From time to time ILSA
called on the governments of both countries to study and review the
environmental and ecological impacts of these insecticides on the
regional biosphere.
On 2 October 2012, ILSA published a report entitled “The Plight of
the Bumblebee.” The report summarized a 20-year peer-reviewed
scientific study examining the negative effects of the increased use
of neonics by Amestonian farmers on populations of bees and other
pollinators. ILSA experts found that the region’s honeybee
population had decreased by some 25% over the previous 20 years,
due in part to the well-documented phenomenon of Colony Collapse
Disorder (“CCD”). The report also found a statistically significant
correlation – but not definitive evidence of causation – between the
gradual increase in CCD and the rise in the use of neonics across the
region. ILSA urged Riesland to reevaluate its production of this type
of insecticide, and Amestonia to reevaluate its extensive use,
suggesting that the only long-term solution would be a complete
phase-out of neonicotinoids. It concluded, “the current rate of
decrease in bee populations will, if it continues unchecked, result in
catastrophic consequences for the environment, for food production,
for sustainable farming, and ultimately for the economies of both
states.”
The European Commission adopted a Regulation on 24 May 2013,
restricting for a period of two years the use of a number of neonics
for seed treatment, soil application, and foliar treatment in crops
attractive to bees. The ILSA report and the European Commission’s
action sparked academic and parliamentary debates in both Riesland
and Amestonia, but no policy changes were undertaken in either
country.
On 2 July 2013, a new website, www.longlivethehive.com, was
launched. The website invited environmental activists to register
online and to utilize its chat rooms to discuss ways to stop the
continued production and use of neonicotinoids. The website quickly
gained attention in Amestonia and Riesland, and at its peak was
visited by approximately 200,000 users a day. Conversations on its
online forums, which protected users’ anonymity, often focused on
lobbying activities in support of draft legislation. However some
members also promoted violent actions, including sabotage and
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arson. One anonymous post, which was later reposted onto social
media and received widespread attention in Amestonia, read: “Our
politicians have failed to respond to peaceful initiatives. We must
take charge and command attention. The despoliation of the Earth,
and of its living creatures, is an act of violence, and unless it is
stopped, it must be responded to effectively and in kind.”
On the night of 2 February 2014, seven Amestonian warehouses
were simultaneously set on fire. The warehouses stored a significant
number of barrels of neonicotinoids. In total, five people died from
smoke inhalation, and many others were injured. Two of the dead
were Rieslandic nationals. Police found spray-painted images of a
bee on the asphalt outside the sites. Initial government reports
estimated the damage from the attacks, including long-term adverse
health consequences for the local population, at €75 million.
The President of Amestonia, Jonathan Hale, was interviewed by
Margaret Mayer on the day following the arson attacks. When asked
about the alleged involvement of environmental activists in the
attacks, President Hale responded: “We do not yet have all of the
facts concerning these terrible, orchestrated crimes. The police are
investigating and will bring the perpetrators to justice. Given the
critical importance of agriculture to our national economy, acts of
sabotage like these should be seen as attacks on us all. My
administration will not tolerate such provocations.”
On 7 March 2014, 263 envelopes containing white powder were sent
to the Ministries of Trade and Agriculture in both Riesland and
Amestonia, to prominent Amestonian farmers, and to board
members of three neonic-producing Rieslandic corporations. The
image of a bee was stamped on the back of all of the envelopes.
Examinations determined that the powder was a non-toxic variant of
a neonicotinoid. An anonymous tweet by user @buzzkiller24601
posted that evening, which quickly went viral, read: “You’ve been
warned. The threat is real. It must be addressed. Next time you’ll
taste your own poison. #banneonics #savethebees.”
President Hale and the Prime Minister of Riesland, Alice Silk,
discussed the arson and the white powder incident in a telephone
conversation the following day. Prime Minister Silk offered
Riesland’s continued cooperation in combatting what she called
“acts of eco-terrorism,” including coordination and sharing of
intelligence information, and stressed the importance of continued
agricultural trade between the two countries. Following the call, the
Prime Minister announced that she had ordered Riesland’s security
and intelligence services to direct their operations against “what
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appears to be a new, growing, and dangerous threat to the well-being
of both of our countries.”
On 16 October 2014, Tom Sivaneta, the Bureau’s Director, met with
the Amestonian Minister of Internal Affairs. He informed the
Minister that the Bureau had succeeded in identifying a ring of
Amestonian environmental activists who had been plotting to
contaminate a large shipment of honey, intended for consumption in
Riesland, with a chemically-altered and toxic neonicotinoid. He
provided the Minister with the names and locations of the ring
members. The following day, Riesland declared a Terrorism Alert
pursuant to the Terrorism Act 2003 (Annex II). The Terrorism Alert
was reissued in April 2015.
On 21 October 2014, the police broke into a garage located in
Amestonia’s capital and apprehended three Amestonian college
students. The students had in their possession significant quantities
of chemically-altered neonicotinoids and detailed maps of a number
of honey extraction facilities in Amestonia. They admitted to
planning an attack (which they insisted would not cause injuries or
deaths), and to being part of a group of environmentalists, which they
called “The Hive.” The students refused to provide the authorities
with the names, locations, or future plans of other members of the
group.
Frederico Frost, a national of Riesland, is a former Bureau
intelligence analyst who had been part of the Bureau’s eco-terrorism
working group, established in early 2014. Frost had full access to
sensitive information relating to Riesland’s intelligence operations
in Amestonia. On the morning of 16 December 2014, Frost drove
from the Bureau’s facilities to Amestonia, where he contacted
Chester & Walsingham, a law firm that had previously represented
defendants in a number of high-profile whistle-blower and national
security cases. Frost handed lawyers from the firm a USB drive
containing nearly 100,000 documents labeled top secret that he said
he had directly downloaded from Bureau computers. The firm agreed
to represent Frost in relation to any disclosure or dissemination of
the materials.
On 18 December 2014, accompanied by his lawyers, Frost met with
two reporters from The Ames Post, Amestonia’s most widelycirculated newspaper. He gave the reporters a copy of the USB drive,
requesting that the newspaper publish the contents on its website. In
a written statement, Frost explained that “I have come to realize how
surveillance programs, like the ones I was engaged in, threaten
individual liberties and sovereign equality. I am compelled to talk
about this! If we are going to trade liberty for security, we have to do
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it with our eyes open. These decisions should be made by the public,
not by politicians.”
In January and February 2015, thousands of documents marked “top
secret” were gradually published, unedited and unredacted, on the
website of The Ames Post, following what the newspaper termed “a
process of authentication and review performed by our reporters and
lawyers.” One of the documents, published on 23 January and
headed “The Verismo Program,” bore a signature of Tom Sivaneta.
It detailed a May 2013 operation he had authorized, in which a
waterproof recording pod was installed on the undersea fiber optic
cable that was the primary backbone for Amestonia’s international
internet and telephone communications traffic. The device was
placed on a section of the cable located in Riesland’s exclusive
economic zone. The pod copied all information that went through the
cable and transferred it to the Bureau’s servers. According to the
document, 1.2 million gigabytes of data were collected and stored
daily pursuant to Verismo. The document also noted that, following
the white powder incident on 7 March, Bureau employees had been
instructed to use all of the Bureau’s resources “to track
environmental activists in Amestonia,” relying on specifically
tailored search terms, or “selectors.”
On 29 January 2015, The Ames Post published on its website a
document on the letterhead of the Office of the Attorney General of
Riesland, James Deloponte. Dated 2 July 2014, it detailed
regulations issued by the Attorney General regarding the Bureau’s
surveillance. The document provided that all data collected by the
Bureau through Verismo or related programs, other than as the result
of investigation of a specific individual, could be stored for a
maximum of two years. It also noted that the Tribunal, in accordance
with the SSBA, had reviewed the Verismo Program every six months
since its inception with no participation from outside experts. The
Parliamentary Committee for Surveillance Oversight had also
reviewed Verismo twice in closed-door hearings, but neither the
Tribunal nor the Committee had ever challenged its legality.
According to the document, Amestonian security authorities had
knowingly accepted, on at least 50 occasions, redacted information
relating to terrorist activity derived from Verismo.
On 2 February 2015, Riesland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a
diplomatic note to his counterpart in Amestonia requesting the
immediate extradition of Frost, in accordance with the 1970
Extradition Treaty, to stand trial for theft and a number of data
security offenses. The diplomatic note also requested that Amestonia
recover the information Frost had downloaded, believed to be held
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by either Chester & Walsingham or The Ames Post, and return it to
Riesland for use in the ongoing criminal investigation against Frost.
It emphasized that “any further publication of these materials will
have a long-term, damaging impact on cooperation between our two
nations in our joint campaign against terrorism.” The Amestonian
Minister indicated that the extradition request would be considered
in accordance with the Treaty, but noted the Amestonian
Government’s “surprise at the reported scope and reach of
Riesland’s surveillance programs.” He called upon the Minister to
provide more information on the extent of these activities and their
impact on Amestonian nationals’ private lives.
On 16 February 2015, the banner headline of The Ames Post website
read: “Margaret the Spy!” Another document leaked by Frost stated
that since its inception in 1992, the premises of the VoR station had
been used by the Bureau to promote its surveillance activities on
Amestonian soil. The document was printed on the letterhead of the
Office of the Bureau’s Director. According to the document,
Margaret Mayer was part of an operation called “the Carmen
Program,” intended to collect intelligence on high-ranking
Amestonian public figures and private sector leaders. Whenever
such individuals came to be interviewed for Mayer’s show, they
were told that their electronic devices could interfere with the
sensitive wireless microphones used during broadcasts. They were
offered the opportunity to place their devices in a locker within their
line of sight from the studio. Electronics placed in the locker were
removed during the interviews by means of a concealed backdoor.
This provided Bureau engineers, who doubled as VoR employees,
sufficient opportunity to hack into the guests’ phones and portable
computers and install a rootkit malware referred to in Frost’s
documents as “Blaster,” which then provided the Bureau full remote
privileged access to these devices. The information collected from
“Carmen” was stored and later analyzed in an underground floor
within the VoR building, code-named “The Opera House.”
A number of memoranda mentioning “Carmen” were also published
in raw form on The Ames Post’s site. They revealed that over 100
Amestonian public figures, businessmen, officials, and diplomats
were surveilled under this program, whose primary objective was “to
collect information concerning Amestonia’s domestic and foreign
policy, in order to advance Riesland’s political and economic
interests in the region.” One memorandum contained an image of
David Cornwell, Amestonia’s Ambassador to the United Nations,
and detailed how Carmen operatives had been able to hack his phone
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and access emails regarding Amestonia’s positions on upcoming
votes in the General Assembly and specialized agencies.
That evening, Amestonian police applied to a judge for an
emergency warrant to seize all assets and property of VoR pending
an investigation into whether criminal offenses had been committed,
citing as probable cause the Carmen Program documents published
by The Ames Post. While the police were in chambers with the judge
applying for the warrant, VoR’s television broadcasting was
interrupted and replaced with old reruns of “Tea Time with
Margaret.” The judge immediately granted the warrant. Upon
execution of the warrant that night, the Amestonian police found the
station unattended, although the TV broadcasting equipment and
various other devices and documents had been left untouched. These
articles were all catalogued and removed by the police.
At 3:15 A.M. the following morning, Amestonia’s Border Patrol,
conducting routine operations, encountered Margaret Mayer and two
other Rieslandic VoR employees on a train crossing into Riesland.
The Border Patrol requested that they present their travel documents
for inspection. They refused, and were promptly detained. When the
commander of the police unit conducting the investigation into VoR
learned of this development, she sought and was granted a warrant
for the arrest of the three on suspicion of espionage. They were
subsequently charged with that offense, and were denied bail on the
basis that they were a flight risk.
President Hale held a press conference on the morning of 17
February 2015. Before taking questions, he read a prepared
statement:
I am deeply troubled by reports that Riesland has, for
decades, engaged in a concerted surveillance campaign
targeting our citizens and violating our territorial
integrity and political independence. Riesland’s own
documents show that these offenses against our
sovereignty were purely politically motivated and had
no public order implications. We are entitled to an
explanation. Any claims that such programs are
necessary to combat terrorism simply ring hollow. No
matter how severe any perceived threat to Riesland’s
national security, there is absolutely no justification for
the systematic infringement of our citizens’ privacy.
Mass electronic surveillance of our people and
institutions violates Riesland’s obligations under the
U.N. Charter, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic
and Consular Relations, the Broadcasting Treaty, and
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principles of comity between nations. Simply put,
gentlemen do not read each other’s mail, and friends do
not spy on friends.
In response to a reporter’s question, President Hale went on to say,
“Our police authorities are treating the VoR facilities and its
equipment as a crime scene. Margaret Mayer and the other VoR
employees are suspected of having committed the very serious crime
of espionage, charges which will be handled according to our laws.”
He denied that the search of the premises and the detention of the
three individuals violated Amestonia’s obligations under the
Broadcasting Treaty, saying: “the VoR facilities and employees lost
their immunities and privileges once the station ceased acting as a
broadcaster and became a nest of spies.” Amestonia then recalled its
ambassador to Riesland for consultations, and officially closed its
TV station in Riesland.
On 19 February 2015, Prime Minister Silk rejected President Hale’s
characterization of Riesland’s and VoR’s activities in a televised
interview. She explained that Riesland’s surveillance programs
complied with both domestic and international law because they
“were prescribed by statutes, structured around minimization
procedures, and routinely reviewed by competent authorities with
oversight power.” She asserted that the methods employed were
“both necessary and proportionate,” observing that the results of the
surveillance “had benefited the national security and interests of
Amestonia just as much as those of Riesland.” She ended her
statement by saying:
Our two nations have enjoyed decades of fruitful
bilateral cooperation, which is now being severely
compromised. We make no apology for our efforts to
keep ourselves and our friends safe from acts of
terrorism. Meanwhile, the Amestonian administration is
hardly reciprocating our acts of friendship. It is
providing sanctuary to Frederico Frost, who is accused
of very serious crimes in Riesland, and has expropriated
our property and arrested our nationals in blatant
disregard of the treaty between us.
Joseph Kafker is a 70-year-old retired Amestonian politician who
founded the Green Party, now the third largest in the Amestonian
Parliament. For years, Kafker has been a vocal opponent of the use
of neonics in agricultural production. During his years as a Member
of Parliament he attempted, on a number of occasions, to promote
legislation banning them. None of these efforts was successful, a fact
he lamented on his retirement in 2012. On 7 March 2015, Kafker was
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invited to give the keynote address at an international environmental
law conference at Riesland’s largest law school. After he completed
his speech, he was detained by the police, allegedly in accordance
with the Terrorism Act. The story broke in the international media
the following day. In a special session, the Amestonian Parliament
adopted a resolution denouncing Kafker’s detention and demanding
his release. The Government of Riesland did not respond.
On 10 March 2015, Kafker’s case was brought before the National
Security Tribunal. Following a request from the Attorney General’s
Office, the Tribunal ruled that all evidence pertaining to Kafker’s
activities and leading to his apprehension was “closed material,” as
the term is defined in the Terrorism Act. The Tribunal further
allowed Bureau officers to testify via video conferencing, with their
faces and voices obscured, regarding the need to detain Kafker.
Following their testimony, the Tribunal granted the petition to extend
Kafker’s detention for reasons of national security. Kafker’s lawyer,
who had been selected from a list of approved “special advocates,”
was present during the proceedings, but was not permitted either to
consult with his client or to share with him any of the secret
information said to substantiate the allegations against him. Kafker
remains detained without charge in a maximum-security facility in
Riesland and his detention has been extended by the Tribunal every
21 days. A motion challenging the constitutionality of the
proceedings was filed before the Supreme Court of Riesland but was
denied.
On 12 March 2015, Amestonia’s Foreign Minister contacted his
counterpart in Riesland and demanded access to the secret evidence
that constituted the basis for Kafker’s detention. He also stated that,
in Amestonia’s view, the Terrorism Act did not comply with
international human rights standards. The Rieslandic Minister
rejected the request, responding that disclosure of the information
concerning Kafker’s apprehension would endanger the integrity of
particular intelligence sources and therefore the national security of
Riesland. The Minister further stressed that the National Security
Tribunal had already determined that the information could not be
disclosed in accordance with the Terrorism Act.
On 14 March 2015, President Hale instructed his Minister of Justice
to refuse the extradition request for Frederico Frost, citing the
“political offense” exception in the Extradition Treaty. He also
ordered that Riesland’s request for the documents held by The Ames
Post be denied. Attorney General Deloponte responded to these
developments in a statement:
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The Government of Riesland has repeatedly made clear
that it will not tolerate the publication of leaked
confidential information, and that it will do whatever is
in its power to disrupt any further threats to our national
security. With or without foreign government support,
we will continue our efforts to bring the fugitive Frost to
justice, and to stop the damage that will result from any
dissemination of Riesland’s top secret documents.
On 17 March 2015, The Ames Post website’s banner read “A Kafkeresque Affair.” A memorandum, sourced from Frost’s USB stick,
revealed that a May 2014 interview with Kafker on “Tea Time with
Margaret” had allowed the Bureau to hack into his electronic
devices. According to the memorandum, Kafker was considered a
“high-level suspect with ties to The Hive, including the planned
contamination of a large shipment of honey with a toxic variant of
neonicotinoids in 2014.” The continuous surveillance of Kafker,
following the bugging of his devices, was considered a “top
priority.” From intercepted communications, Bureau analysts were
able to establish that Kafker was a frequent visitor to the
longlivethehive website, had participated in online chats, and had
used the forum’s “like” function to endorse conversations including
calls for violent disruptions to raise public awareness of the neonics
controversy. Attorney General Deloponte refused to comment on
questions raised by the media following The Ames Post’s
publication. He stated only that Riesland was in possession of
“closed materials” that “directly link Kafker to The Hive’s senior
echelons.”
On 22 March 2015, the computer networks and communication
switches at both The Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham were
hacked and disabled. Investigators found that the hackers had used a
malicious program to disrupt the operation of the computer systems
and to corrupt master boot records, to the extent that nearly 90% of
the information was “non-recoverable.”
Based on traffic analysis, cyber security experts from the
Amestonian Institute of Technology concluded: “The malware used
in the hacking of the computers has been traced to IP addresses
within Riesland’s territory that are associated with Riesland’s
computer infrastructures. Significant segments of code in the
malware are exact replicas of those used in the Bureau’s ‘Blaster’
program. These code segments are not otherwise known to be in use
or available to the general public.” Both Chester & Walsingham and
The Ames Post contracted external appraisers, who have estimated
the combined damages related to infrastructure and to unrecoverable
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data at €45-50 million. A significant number of proceedings before
Amestonian courts were delayed for months as a result of Chester &
Walsingham’s inability to access its files. The Ames Post had to shut
down its operations entirely; it resumed publication only in June
2015.
On 1 April 2015, President Hale issued a statement denouncing the
cyberattacks, stating that “all of the evidence points back to the
Bureau and to Riesland.” He described them as “not only
undermining freedom of expression and attorney-client privilege –
essential values in and of themselves,” but as an “assault upon the
very principles that stand at the core of our society.” In an interview
with local news held on 5 April 2015, Attorney General Deloponte
refused to respond to allegations that Riesland was involved in the
attacks.
On 22 April 2015, the Amestonian Ministry of Justice announced
that the police investigation into the items found at the VoR station
premises had determined that a number of them had been used for
surveillance. The Ministry reported that it had obtained a forfeiture
order against the premises and all property found there on the basis
that it was employed in criminal activity. Finally, the Ministry stated
its intention to sell the station’s real estate and property, estimated to
be worth €20 million, by public auction. Challenges to the original
warrant dated 16 February 2015 and to the forfeiture order, presented
to Amestonia’s High Court by attorneys from Riesland National
Television Corporation, were rejected. All subsequent appeals were
summarily dismissed. The auction has been stayed until the
conclusion of all outstanding legal proceedings before the
International Court of Justice.
In mid-2015, diplomats from Riesland and Amestonia began
meeting in an attempt to settle their differences. After several months
of negotiations, the parties were unable to reach an agreement. In
July 2015, Amestonia circulated among the members of the United
Nations Human Rights Council the text of a proposed resolution
calling on the recently-appointed Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Privacy to investigate whether Riesland’s cyber and surveillance
programs were in compliance with international law. An article
published in The Sydney Morning Herald on 9 July 2015 reported
that Riesland’s supporters on the Council had urged it to resolve its
disputes with Amestonia. A source within the Council told the
newspaper: “A number of countries voiced their concern that the
continued uncertainty as to the legality of the challenged surveillance
programs would hinder their ability to continue to engage and share
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intelligence with Riesland without fear of being complicit in human
rights abuses.”
In light of growing international pressure, Riesland and Amestonia
agreed to refer all matters in dispute to the International Court of
Justice, and for this purpose have drafted and signed this Special
Agreement. Riesland, however, has reserved its objections to the
admissibility of information derived from any confidential
documents that may have been provided to The Ames Post by Frost.
The parties agreed that the issue of the admissibility of the
documents would be left for the Court to resolve, as reflected in
Article 2(b) of this Special Agreement.
Amestonia and Riesland are both members of the United Nations,
and are parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice; the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations; the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations; the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings; and the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Neither state has made
any reservations, declarations or understandings with regard to any
of these treaties.
Applicant asks the Court to adjudge and declare that:
(1)
The documents published on the website of The Ames
Post are admissible as evidence before the Court;
Riesland’s mass electronic surveillance programs
against Amestonian public figures and nationals
revealed in those documents violates international
law; and Amestonia is therefore entitled to an order
directing the immediate cessation of those programs
with assurances of non-repetition;
(2)
The seizure and forfeiture of the VoR station and its
equipment, and the arrest of Margaret Mayer and the
other two VoR employees, did not violate the
Broadcasting Treaty, and were in accordance with
Amestonia’s other international law obligations;
(3)
The detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism
Act violated international law, and Amestonia is
therefore entitled to his immediate release, the
disclosure of all information which formed the basis
of his apprehension, and the payment of compensation
for his detention; and
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The cyber attacks against the computer systems of The
Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable
to Riesland, and constitute an internationally wrongful
act for which Amestonia is entitled to compensation.
Respondent asks the Court to adjudge and declare that:
(1)
The illicitly-obtained documents published on the
website of The Ames Post are inadmissible before the
Court, but in the event that the Court does find them
to be admissible, they do not evidence any breach by
Riesland of an international obligation owed to
Amestonia;
(2)
The arrest of Margaret Mayer and the other VoR
employees, and the expropriation of the VoR facility
and its equipment, violated the Broadcasting Treaty
and international law generally, and Riesland is
therefore entitled to the immediate release of its
nationals and compensation for the value of the
confiscated property;
(3)
Riesland’s detention of Joseph Kafker under the
Terrorism Act is consistent with its obligations under
international law, and the Court has no authority to
order either Kafker’s release or the disclosure of the
information relating to his apprehension; and
(4)
The cyber attacks against the computer systems of The
Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham cannot be
attributed to Riesland, and in any event did not
constitute an internationally wrongful act.
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ANNEX I
TREATY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF BROADCASTING FACILITIES
BETWEEN THE STATE OF AMESTONIA
AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF RIESLAND
4 MARCH 1992
[excerpts]

The State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland (“the
Contracting Parties”),
(a) desiring to fortify the friendship between the two countries; (b)
recognizing the importance of strengthening understanding and cooperation
between their peoples; (c) seeking to offer their citizens radio and television
channels that will reflect the two nations’ dynamic political, cultural, and
artistic activity; have agreed upon the following articles:
ARTICLE 1
1. Each Contracting Party may establish and operate in the territory of the
other a radio and television broadcasting station.
2. The land on which each station will be constructed will be procured by
the operating-state and held in its name. The operating state will be
responsible for staffing, running, and funding the station, and shall
procure at its own expense and in its own name the materials and other
equipment required for its operation.
[...]
ARTICLE 2
Each station shall produce and air programs and content including news
stories, interviews, documentaries, and movies produced either in or by the
operating country, with local viewers and listeners in the host country as the
target audiences.
[...]
ARTICLE 14
1. The premises referenced in article 1(2) of the present Treaty shall be
inviolable, and agents of the host state may not enter those premises
without the consent of the head of the station. Such consent may be
assumed only in cases of fire or other similar disaster posing or
threatening serious immediate danger to public safety or order.
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2. In addition to the premises of the station, its furnishings, equipment, and
other property used in its operation, as well as its means of transport,
shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment, expropriation, or
execution.
3. The receiving state is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to
protect the premises of the station against any intrusion or damage, and
to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the premises or impairment of
its dignity.
4. The archives and documents of the station shall bear visible external
marks of identification, and shall be inviolable at all times and wherever
they may be.
[...]
ARTICLE 15
1. Each station's employees, who are also nationals of the operating state,
shall be entitled to the
following immunities and privileges:
a) The persons of each station’s employees shall be inviolable, and
they shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The
host state shall treat them with due respect and shall take all
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their freedom or
dignity.
b) Each station’s personnel shall enjoy immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state, and shall not be obliged to give
evidence as witnesses.
c) In respect of acts performed by an employee of the station in the
exercise of its functions, the immunities and privileges shall
continue to subsist after the employee’s functions at the station
have come to an end.
[...]
ARTICLE 23
1. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of
all persons employed by each station to respect the laws and
regulations of the host state. Those who are nationals of the operating
state have an additional duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of
the host state.
2. The premises of the station must not be used in any manner
incompatible with the station’s functions as envisaged in the present
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Treaty, in other rules of general international law, or in any other
agreements in force between the Parties hereto.

[...]
ARTICLE 36
All privileges and immunities provided for in this Treaty, save for those in
Article 15(1)(c) above, shall cease to have effect upon the cessation of the
station’s functions as envisaged in the present Treaty.
[...]
ARTICLE 40
The term of this agreement shall be 30 years.

(Signed)
Shannon Belle Cambridge
Minister of Telecommunications
State of Amestonia

(Signed)
John Andre Sorge
Minister of State of
Telecommunications
Federal Republic of
Riesland
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ANNEX II
TERRORISM ACT 2003
[excerpts]

1. Definitions
[...]
“National Security Tribunal” (“the Tribunal”) shall have the meaning given
that term under the Secret Surveillance Bureau Act 1967;
[...]
“Terrorist Act” shall mean an act as defined in Article 2.1(b) of the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
(9 December 1999);
[...]
2. Terrorism Alert
If the Government receives information that there is a credible danger of an
imminent terrorist act being committed in Riesland, it may issue a Terrorism
Alert. Such an Alert shall be valid for six months, unless it is revoked earlier.
Upon its expiration or revocation, the Government may issue a new
Terrorism Alert if it considers that the credible danger of terrorist acts still
persists or has been revived.
3. Detention Powers
a. When a Terrorism Alert is in force, the Government may detain any
foreign national suspected of being involved in instigating, authorizing,
planning, financing, carrying out, or aiding a Terrorist Act, as defined
herein, for a period not exceeding 180 days.
b. Except as provided herein, no court shall review the detention of any
person hereunder, but every detainee shall be brought before the Tribunal
within three days of his or her detention.
c. Proceedings before the Tribunal will be held in secret, and its
proceedings will not be disclosed to the public or the media. Records of
the Tribunal’s proceedings shall be entitled to the highest protection
provided by law.
d. The Tribunal may decide whether continued detention of an individual
is required for reasons of national security or public safety. The Tribunal
shall give appropriate consideration to factors including, but not limited
to:
i. the likelihood that the detainee has in fact committed, instigated,
authorized, planned, financed, or aided a Terrorist Act;
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ii.

the likelihood that the detainee will commit a Terrorist Act or will
incite others to do so if he or she is released;
iii. the likelihood of family or government rehabilitation or support
for the detainee if he or she is released;
iv. the likelihood that the detainee may be subject to criminal trial,
whether under this Act or some other statute;
v. the likelihood that, following release, the detainee’s country of
nationality will request extradition from Riesland; and
vi. any substantial interest in the detainee expressly stated by
national law enforcement or intelligence authorities.
e. In making its decision under subsection (d), the Tribunal may receive
and accept any documentary or testimonial evidence from any source. It
shall determine whether or not particular evidence is to be treated as
“closed material.” Closed material shall not be made available to the
detainee, his or her counsel, or third parties, without the Tribunal’s
authorization.
f. In proceedings before the Tribunal, officials from the security and
intelligence authorities may be allowed to testify anonymously via video
conferencing with their faces and voices obscured.
g. After the initial review provided in subsection (b), each detainee will be
brought before the Tribunal no less often than every 21 days for a
periodic review. The Tribunal will consider whether conditions such as
those listed under subsection (d) have changed, allowing for the
detainee’s criminal prosecution or release.
h. The Tribunal may extend the detention of any detainee in appropriate
circumstances, but no detainee shall remain in custody under this Act for
a period of more than 540 days in total.
i. Persons detained under this Act may be represented by legal counsel to
be selected by them from a list of “Special Advocates,” who possess
appropriate security clearance. This list shall be compiled by the
Attorney General. Only Special Advocates will be entitled to participate
in proceedings where closed material is presented. A Special Advocate
may not disclose closed materials to or discuss them with the detainee or
any third party, or obtain the detainee’s instructions pertaining to such
materials.
[...]

